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The level and nature of competition in supermarket retailing in Australia has been
hotly debated as a policy issue in recent times. The creeping acquisitions of smaller
groups by Coles and Woolworths have led to several investigations amid claims that
consumers will be disadvantaged by the growth of the two big chains. Yet little con-
vincing evidence has been found to support these assertions. Although on occasions
the big two may have used their power vertically to squeeze suppliers, consumers have
experienced highly competitive retail markets. In this paper, it is argued that it is mar-
ket conduct, not structure, that should be the prime focus of regulatory and policy
interest, and that recent corporate activity may lead to a third force in supermarket
retailing in Australia that could not only ensure continued competitiveness in the
industry, but could also help to constrain the successful exercise of vertical market
power by the two big chains. Accordingly, it is argued that intervention as a general
policy in supermarket retailing would not be socially efﬁcient, at least not until a wide
range of objective and quantitative assessments have been carried out on the opera-








In their papers in this issue, originally presented to the 49th AARES Annual
Conference, Cotterill (2006) and Smith (2006) have added to their consider-
able research on various aspects of supermarket competition and regulation.
Together, they present an important assessment of many of the theoretical,
empirical and policy issues that surround one of the biggest retailing sectors
in Australia. Supermarket retailing is important from a policy perspective, as it
affects the welfare of almost every Australian consumer. It offers a smor-
gasbord of analytical and policy issues relating to location; design; marketing;
advertising; scale and scope economies; growth; choice; countervailing power;
 
* This paper is based on the commentary (updated to allow for recent events) by the author
on the papers by Ron Cotterill and Rhonda Smith, originally presented at the 49th AARES
Annual Conference held at Coffs Harbour in February 2005, and now published in this issue.
I am grateful to the conference organisers, and in particular to Garry Grifﬁth, for inviting me
to be the discussant on these papers, and to the referees and editors for their helpful suggestions
on this paper. The content, opinions, and analyses should of course be ascribed to me alone
and not to any other person, nor to any organisation with which I am connected. Any errors
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mergers and acquisitions; horizontal and vertical use of market power; strategic
behaviour; barriers to entry, expansion and exit; the ﬁve forces of competition
(a term ﬁrst coined by Porter (1980) to describe competitive forces arising from
existing rivals, potential rivals, other broad substitute products, suppliers, and
customers); consumer protection; product and geographic diversiﬁcation; ver-
tical integration; product differentiation; and mergers between suppliers to
give them greater bargaining power against the retail chains. An example of
the last listed issue occurred early in 2005 in the United States when Procter





billion deal, in order to give the combined ﬁrm greater clout to respond to
the pressures placed on them by retailing giants like Walmart.
The focus on supermarkets in Australia has been more at the policy and
regulatory level rather than in terms of economic research, as more and more
individual supermarkets and small chains have become marginalised and taken
over by the big two – Woolworths and Coles. The decline of small business, lack
of choice, and convenience for consumers, the concentration of market power
in two companies, and the pressure put on both large and small suppliers to
supermarkets, have been the subject of government inquiries (see, for example,
Joint Select Committee on the Retailing Sector (1999), ACCC (2002), and
the Dawson Inquiry into the Trade Practices Act in 2003) and much political
debate. But the power of the two continues to grow, although in May 2005 the
IGA group sought to acquire a large number of supermarkets from the Food-
land group, suggesting that a new third force will emerge that at least in some
respects has the potential to curb any misuse of their market power.
Nevertheless, there are still many unanswered questions. For example, in
the wholesale functional market, do suppliers have any degree of bargaining
equality with the two big chains? In the retail functional market, how well
are consumers protected from the power of two? Can they rely on intense
rivalry between the two chains as they ﬁght for market share? Does this
rivalry produce genuinely competitive outcomes? Do the big two create strategic
barriers to entry or expansion by smaller chains or individual stores, or are
there inherent structural barriers to any entry that could effectively constrain
the incumbent operators? Do the big chains pass through to consumers all or
any part of the lower prices they extract from their suppliers?
Whose fault is it that we have to ask all these questions? Are politicians to
blame for not curbing through the law the expansion of Coles and Wool-
worths? Is the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) at
fault for not having taken enough legal action to halt whatever anticompetitive
conduct the big chains might have engaged in, or for not stepping in sooner
to stop their acquisitive activities? Have the ‘creeping acquisitions’ become
the ‘galloping grab’? In other words, when should we say ‘enough’? Have the
courts penalised the two chains too lightly when they have been found guilty
of breaches of the Trade Practices Act?
The overarching research, policy and regulatory question is this: have we
passed the point of no return in Australia, with two giant national chains 
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dominating almost every geographic retail market for the bundle of products that
they sell, with no real prospect of commercially signiﬁcant entry or expansion by
rivals that will be able to constrain them in a sustainable manner? Regardless
of the answer, we need to ask what should be done about the industry – leave it
to market forces, or intervene (and if so, on what grounds, and to what extent)?
It is on such issues that Cotterill and Smith have focused our attention.
 
2. The shopping list – research questions and policy issues
 
Cotterill (2006) and Smith (2006) present research bundles and agendas that
are complementary. Cotterill focuses on theoretical and estimation issues like
modelling and data availability, and on critically evaluating the overseas
research. In contrast, Smith devotes her attention to Australian policy and
enforcement issues. Both authors recognise that market power exists in the
hands of the big supermarket chains. Both argue that we need to discover
more about its origins and effects along the whole supply chain, from the
supermarket back to the producer of raw material inputs. Both express concern
that suppliers to supermarkets as well as retail customers are vulnerable to the
market power of the big chains, should they choose to exercise it in an attempt
to convert the surplus of these groups into their own private surplus. Both
recognise the need for sound policy guidance and efﬁcient regulatory attention.
Between them, Cotterill and Smith cover many research issues, including
the problem of deﬁning the relevant analytical market; the use of unilateral and
coordinated horizontal market power; problems in empirically distinguishing
between market power and efﬁciency effects; the use of vertical market power
and the pass through to consumers of any subsequent savings; home brands;
vertical and horizontal acquisitions; the chains acting as ‘gatekeepers’ for
upstream and downstream market participants; and whether there exists a
policy and social need to support small independent supermarkets. In this
paper I will comment on some of these issues, and offer an assessment of
their arguments and how relevant these might be in late 2005, given the likely
emergence of a third national supermarket chain that should be able to pro-




None of the four theoretical dimensions of a market – product, geographic,
functional, and temporal – are easily deﬁned in relation to supermarkets. There
are too many overlapping factors that result in a lack of deﬁnitional clarity in
these boundaries. This makes empirical work more difﬁcult, and often results
in ‘last resort’ data being used that comes from analytically inappropriate,
even though factually correct, national data. The relevant markets for super-
market retailing are recognised as being relatively narrow, geographically
speaking. Yet government committees of inquiry into supermarket retailing 
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make their recommendations based on imperfect data relating  to so-called
markets that are statistical aggregations rather than relating to proper eco-
nomic markets. Good policies cannot come from such inappropriate empirical
foundations. Better data are needed, to be ﬁtted to better delineated markets
that accord with shopping realities as well as being theoretically apposite.
Market deﬁnition is a means to an end – to assess whether a ﬁrm’s conduct
is anticompetitive. It is a process by which to group together all those ﬁrms
whose actions will have a lasting constraint on the ﬁrm in question. As Fran-
klin Fisher (1979) pointed out, it is much better to ask this question directly
rather than indirectly through the inaccurate process of market deﬁnition.
But old habits die hard, even if they may not be particularly helpful in light
of new theories or measurement techniques.
Few would dispute that the ‘product’ sold by supermarkets is really a bundle
of goods, services, customer convenience, and other shopping characteristics
that yield greater utility to consumers in the bundle than if the bundle were
disaggregated and all constituent items were purchased separately. But this
begs the question of what constituent goods should be included in the bundle,
and how big the supermarkets should be (in terms of ﬂoor area) to give
shoppers the package dimensions that they want. What is put in the bundle,
for example, will determine what type of retail outlets are classiﬁed to the
market, and this will determine the limit to which constraints are looked for
when assessing the conduct of the chains in question.
One indisputable fact that emerges from both Cotterill’s and Smith’s
papers is that, no matter how markets are deﬁned, supermarkets operate in
highly concentrated markets around the world. But a word of caution is
needed – concentration statistics or even market shares attributable to indi-
vidual ﬁrms by themselves tell us nothing about the dynamics of competition
within a relevant market. They present a snapshot only, and tell us neither
how ﬁrms obtained those market shares, nor whether those shares are cur-
rently increasing or decreasing, and they certainly offer no guide as to what
might happen as future market conditions change. Researchers need to go
behind concentration data and look at what ﬁrms actually do, and how they
react to each other strategically.
 
4. Horizontal market power issues
 
By itself, size does not matter. Firms may be big because they are better, and
customers recognise this, or because they treat their suppliers fairly and so
inputs of the desired quality and quantity are always available. But unques-
tionably, the larger a ﬁrm becomes, the greater is its potential to exercise uni-
lateral market power to the detriment of customers or suppliers, and the
greater become its opportunities to work with (or even coerce) rivals in a
coordinated use of horizontal market power (generally known as coordinated
effects). Cotterill (2006) provides us with a timely review of some of the
overseas evidence, mainly from the United States, of this phenomenon. Prices 
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and proﬁts are signiﬁcantly related to concentration and/or market share, with
this relationship being due to market power effects rather than to the superior
efﬁciency thought by some to be associated with large market shares. These
results seem to hold true regardless of methodology, time period, or type of
market/product investigated. Mergers have been shown to lead to signiﬁcant
price increases. On the basis of these ﬁndings, United States merger policy
towards supermarkets acts in a structural way, based on critical concentra-
tion levels for the relevant market. However, it must be doubted whether such
overseas ﬁndings should be used as the basis for stopping supermarket mergers
in Australia, as comparable research has yet to be carried out. Also, the
adage ‘if it ain’t broke, don’t ﬁx it’ seems to be apt, certainly from the con-
sumer’s point of view.
In contrast to Cotterill, Smith (2006) focuses on the underlying characteris-
tics of Australian supermarket retailing, and discusses how scale and scope
economies are important in explaining the structure of the industry, and how
small  units ﬁnd it hard to compete with the vertically integrated chains,
except through membership of banner groups, which gives a brand image
and provides some scale economies in marketing and buying. Nevertheless,
these smaller units do survive by emphasising different elements of the bundle,
such as temporal shopping convenience, faster checkouts, gourmet foods, and
easier  parking. Yet despite this, their numbers are declining in Australia,
through either natural attrition or creeping acquisitions by the large chains.
As these chains get larger, the harder it becomes for a new entrant or a
smaller chain to expand sufﬁciently to enable them to compete on equal terms.
Suitable sites are hard to ﬁnd. Scale and scope economies are difﬁcult to
achieve on a comparable level. However, such entry or expansion barriers have
not been strategically raised by Woolworths and Coles, but rather have developed
as a result of market forces and the ability of these chains to grow because they
have satisﬁed consumer preferences. Entry has occurred, even at the chain level,
with the Aldi group for example, albeit on a small scale and not offering the same
bundled product as Coles and Woolworths. It may be that this entry has
forced the two chains to counter with new strategies based on cheaper home
brands that are themselves differentiated within any given product – giving
the consumer a choice of home brands for any one good – something not
heretofore available. Such responses suggest the competitive process is alive
and well in the supermarket industry, at least at the retail functional level.
Nevertheless, Smith points out, correctly, that an information imbalance
exists between consumers and retailers, as search costs can be prohibitive
when trying to discover and compare the prices and service levels of each
chain. This encourages the chains to promote the idea of buying on reputa-
tion to save consumers the costs of search. Once such brand loyalty is
obtained, it gives them market power over consumers, due to the undesirabil-
ity of incurring switching costs if a search has to be made for a new preferred
chain. These micro foundations of supermarket power present a research
area that cries out for the attention of economists. 
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5. Vertical market power
 
Vertical market power can be used forwards and backwards in several ways.
Cotterill (2006) documents the recent explosion of research in this area, and
highlights the problem of coalescing power that can be used by big chains
and brand name manufacturers to raise prices to ﬁnal consumers and lower
the prices paid to raw material suppliers. This is an interesting phenomenon,
but to be successful the chain must be unconstrained by rivals, through sheer
size or through collusive agreements, and the raw material suppliers must
have no alternative purchasers of their product. Neither of these scenarios
appears to be present in Australia. More interesting, perhaps, is Cotterill’s
vertical collusion game in which a dominant retailer extracts a lower price
from a supplier than do rival retailers, and then raises its selling price in such
a way that the rivals make more proﬁt than before, leaving ﬁnal consumers
worse off. Such conduct in Australia, if it exists (unlikely, I believe), might be
difﬁcult to attack under s.46 of the Trade Practices Act, although action
could possibly be taken under s.45 as a case of tacit collusion between retailers.
Cotterill spends some time on double marginalisation, which comes about
when two vertically adjacent ﬁrms in a supply chain each seek to maximise
proﬁts. This can raise retail prices, decrease ﬁnal output, and lower total supply
chain proﬁt. Vertical integration eliminates the problem, but in practice a chain
cannot buy all of its suppliers nor can a monopoly manufacturer buy all of
the supermarkets it supplies. Private labels can reduce double marginalisation
(as can trade promotions), and consumers will pay less, so long as they are
happy to buy the private label product. It will be instructive to observe con-
sumers’ acceptance over time of the tiered private label offerings of Coles and
Woolworths, and to measure the savings to be made compared with the
equivalent branded products, and also to assess the relative price differences
between private labels and brand names for a range of different goods.
Throughout Cotterill’s assessment of vertical market power, there is an
implicit assumption that losses to ﬁnal consumers, farmers and other input
suppliers are socially bad. That may well be so in a private sense, but net
social welfare is hard to measure, and the welfare standard that is used must
be carefully spelled out. Cotterill appears to favour a consumer welfare
standard of sorts, in which distributional issues are important. Others might
support the use of a total welfare standard, in which it is the overall gain to
society that should be maximised – the size of the pie – rather than who gets
the biggest or fairest slice. In the recent decision of the Australian Competition




2005 ATPR 42–065; [2005] ACompT 9, at paras 166–191), the total welfare
standard was endorsed for use in Australia, subject to due consideration
being given to the weight that should be applied to gains in the hands of
ﬁrms that are not passed through to customers.
Smith (2006) identiﬁes the basic conditions under which the power of super-
markets as buyers can be used to the disadvantage of suppliers. Woolworths 
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and Coles hold the aces here, in the form of a shortage of shelf space in their
stores (relative to the demand for it by product manufacturers), and the
greater value of this shelf space compared to that held by rival groups, due to
customer preferences for the bundle offered by the two big chains. If manu-
facturers want access to these customers, they have to deal with the big
chains. If they are not ‘in’, they are likely to be ‘out’ with consumers, because,
as Smith points out, consumer loyalty to a store or chain is likely to be greater
than it is to a brand, and few products are regarded as ‘must have’. The cost
of switching brands within a store if the preferred one is not available is likely
to be less than the cost of going to another outlet.
Smith points out that through their buying power over their suppliers, the
big chains can extract listing fees, shelf fees, and promotional support from
them that the smaller supermarkets cannot obtain. But these manufacturers
cannot seek to recover the lost proﬁts (income transfer) from their smaller
customers – the independent supermarkets – as to do so would mean increasing
the prices charged to them, which would make them less competitive in the
retail market, leading to lower sales volumes for them and greater sales going
to the big chains, giving them even more power to deal with the manufacturers.
It is important to realise that a chain ﬁrst develops the horizontal market
power, and from this follows the vertical power. Without the ﬁrst it cannot
have the second. If misuse of vertical power is of concern, the ﬁrst-best line
of attack is on the horizontal power. But if the big chains are competing hard
for the consumer’s dollar, then little justiﬁcation exists for intervention,
unless it is on distributional grounds – and this is a policy decision, not an
economic one based on efﬁciency considerations.
 
6. Horizontal acquisitions and market conduct
6.1 Current and future levels of competition
 
The markets in which Australian supermarkets compete are dynamic in
terms of innovation and offering consumers real choices. In these circum-
stances, markets can produce results not foreseen by economic theories. Mar-
ket outcomes in one country will not necessarily be replicated in another. An
empirical or theoretical outlier in one country could be the norm in a differ-
ent institutional context. If it is thought desirable to seek new policy directions
for the Australian supermarket industry, they must be carefully tailored to
reﬂect the local, and ever-changing, institutional framework. Some of the
assessments and recommendations put forward by Cotterill (2006) and Smith
(2006) must be seen through this lens.
It is not market shares that determine the level of competition, but the
battle between rivals to secure a lasting competitive advantage over each
other (which is likely never to occur in any sustained way in Australian super-
market retailing, short of some commercial mishap or funding disaster). Co-
ordinated market conduct is unlikely in such circumstances, especially where 
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a fringe of independent rivals exists that could expand in the event of collusive
behaviour by the bigger chains. That market behaviour and not market shares
should be the key element for determining whether a market is likely to be
competitive was stressed by the Australian Competition Tribunal in the rea-
sons handed down in mid-2005 in its decision to approve an application by
Qantas and Air New Zealand to form a strategic alliance that would coordinate
and control all aspects of their pricing, ﬂight scheduling and operations on





 (2005) ATPR 42–065; [2004] ACompT 9, at paras 429–446).
Although many have been critical in recent years of the growing domin-
ance of Coles and Woolworths, at least in structural terms (Woolworths cur-
rently has an estimated 41 per cent of the market and Coles 35 per cent (see
Jimenez and Andrusiak 2005)), consumers do not appear to have suffered.
It cannot be said that they are facing less competition in the retailing of the
supermarket ‘one-stop-shop’ package. There is intense ongoing rivalry between
the chains to attract the customer at the margin, in terms of prices, the range
of goods sold and services offered, store innovations, and the roll-out of new
stores. Concern has been expressed at the relentless ‘creeping acquisition’ by
Woolworths and Coles of small independent supermarkets and retailers in
other areas such as petrol and liquor retailing, but competition is ﬁerce both
between the big two and with other rivals in each of these areas of retailing.
The Australian Consumers Association appears not to be concerned about
increased market concentration, saying in May 2005 that ‘prices had come
down with consolidation in the industry’ (reported in Jimenez and Andru-
siak 2005). This comment was in response to an announcement that Wool-
worths was seeking to increase its market share further through gaining
control over 20 supermarkets and three development sites currently owned
(and mainly situated in Western Australia) by the Foodland group. The other
60 Australian supermarkets operated by Foodland will be acquired by Metcash,
the operator of the IGA chain, which will also acquire Foodland’s extensive
wholesale grocery business that supplies to independent supermarkets across
Australia, likely generating signiﬁcant back ofﬁce and sales force economies.
This acquisition will add only marginally to the Australia-wide strength of
Woolworths, but will result in it overtaking Coles in Western Australia in
terms of the number of outlets operated (Hughes 2005 reports that Woolworths
currently has only a 30 per cent share of the market in Western Australia.)
On 19 October 2005, the ACCC announced that it would not oppose the
acquisition by Woolworths of 19 of the 20 Action stores it sought to acquire.
The ACCC did, however, insist that the other Action store sought by Woolworths
be acquired instead by Metcash, as a result of its concerns about diminished
local-area competition. In making its assessment, the ACCC took into account
regional and local market characteristics as well as national factors.
It has been the ACCC’s habit to look at relatively narrow geographic mar-
kets when assessing mergers between small independents or local chains, the
argument being that consumers tend to do supermarket shopping within a 
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relatively small radius of home. Given the tendency of supermarkets to
co-locate in order to maximise their customer reach, the ACCC needs to
check that in any given area an acquisition will not lead to a substantial less-
ening of competition, or will not deter potential competitors from entering
the area. It found that many of the stores sought by Woolworths did not
compete in the same local markets as existing Woolworths’ stores, and those
that did currently compete with Woolworths would continue to face strong
competition from Coles, Foodland, Aldi, and other independently operated
supermarkets. In addition, it had sought evidence from participants in the
relevant markets as to whether the acquisitions by Woolworths would be
likely to result in a substantial lessening of competition in any procurement
or supply market, but no such evidence was forthcoming.
This move by Woolworths is indicative of the fact that internal or organic
supermarket growth is becoming more difﬁcult for the two big chains.
Obtaining suitable development sites is a problem, and with high market
shares, both individually and collectively, the battle for the customer at the
margin is an intense and expensive one. Coles’ and Woolworths’ aggressive
expansion of capacity in recent years has been well ahead of population
growth (Evans 2005). Changed shopping habits have prompted their expan-
sion into convenience-type outlets. The most efﬁcient way, both privately and
socially, for the two big chains to grow now may instead be through external
growth via acquisition.
Although there appears to be no shortage of hard competition in super-
market retailing, the emergence of the IGA group as a strong third player
will be a socially desirable outcome of the Woolworths’ acquisition of the
Foodland outlets. Consumers and suppliers will beneﬁt. It is highly unlikely
that such a position could have been obtained through internal expansion by
IGA, certainly not in the short run. In addition, second-tier operators have
not had much success in obtaining a competitively signiﬁcant market share in
Australia to date. The entry by Aldi, the German discount chain, used a no-
frills and limited lines business model that suggests it will always be a niche
player, unless the one-stop package falls out of favour with Australian shoppers.
However, any concerns that Woolworths and Coles might recognise their
interdependence and coordinate their selling strategies can be safely dismissed.
Australian supermarket retailing is poised to enter a new phase of even more
intense competition.
There are three groups of market participants who will likely be better off
as a result of the acquisition by Woolworths and Metcash of the Foodland
stores – ﬁnal consumers, independent retailers and small regional chains, and
suppliers of groceries and other products to supermarket chains.
 
6.2 Gains to consumers
 
Consumers will be better off as the already high levels of competitive activity
will increase, and there is likely to be an increased emphasis on innovation in 
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the retailing package (there are some who believe that Coles and Woolworths,
as duopolists, have not been as innovative in retailing as they could have been,
especially compared with their overseas counterparts (see Jimenez and Andrusiak
2005)), either by the big two in order to keep the IGA group at bay, or by the
IGA group to position itself for organic growth and to seek those customers
at the margin who had never before considered shopping at an independent
supermarket. The old adage ‘two’s company, three’s a crowd’ is equally appli-
cable to supermarket retailing – to survive in a market crowd of three, each
group will need to ﬁnd new and sustainable ways of appealing to consumers.
Savings that the chains may enjoy on the supply side through their greater
buying power should be passed on in the form of greater consumer beneﬁts.
It is of course not guaranteed that prices will fall signiﬁcantly. Although
the IGA group’s customers may ﬁnd lower prices than before (but it must be
remembered that IGA is a banner group for independently owned super-
markets, each of which is free to determine its own prices), prices in the
Woolworths and Safeway, and Coles and Bi-Lo, supermarkets may not be
competed down below current levels. Margins are already low. But the third
force will provide the competitive tension needed to keep prices low – and
perhaps they could fall a little further at least until the IGA group has estab-
lished a market presence. The threat of the ACCC taking action under s.46 of
the Trade Practices Act, which prohibits a ﬁrm with a substantial degree of
power in a market from taking advantage of this power to deter competitive
behaviour in the market, or to eliminate or substantially damage a competitor,
should ensure that no predatory tactics are used by Woolworths or Coles to
retard unfairly any expansion by the IGA group.
However, consumers may in the short run suffer from some lack of choice
of brands, if Woolworths and Coles successfully implement their preferred
strategy of stocking two or three levels of private label product and only one
or two brand labels. Smith (2006) notes that consumers could be disadvan-
taged by the power of these chains if it results in less innovation, lower levels
of quality and less choice. Such problems do not appear to have occurred to
date in Australia, except perhaps for those consumers who would have pre-
ferred to shop at the smaller stores which have exited the market or have been
acquired by the big two. Whether the new brand strategy succeeds will very
much depend on consumer reaction, especially if key preferred elements of
their shopping package are no longer offered by the big two, and on what
stocking strategy is adopted by the expanded IGA group.
Whether the loss of smaller retailers, especially in country areas, can be
ascribed to the market power of Coles and Woolworths is a matter of debate.
As Smith points out, small independent supermarkets undoubtedly support
their local communities, whereas the big chains have focused on larger cities
whose population supports their bigger store and preferred uniform product
range (rather than catering to local tastes). However, in the 1990s service
activities were increasingly rationalised into regional centres, and such busi-
ness was combined by consumers with a shopping trip for convenience reasons, 
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as well as for the lower prices on offer. In addition, the big chains have adapted
and developed smaller format stores that have made it more proﬁtable for them
to either set up outlets or acquire small independent stores in smaller cities.
In the face of centralisation and agglomeration economies, the decline of small
country and regional retailers is inevitable and cannot be directly ascribed to
the power of the big chains.
 
6.3 Beneﬁts for independent supermarkets and suppliers
 
Independent retailers and small chain owners should also be better off as a
result of the Foodland sale. Following the increased size resulting from Met-
cash’s acquisition of the Foodland stores not acquired by Woolworths, giving
it an estimated national retail market share of around 18 per cent, approxi-
mately half that of Coles, it should be able to do better deals with suppliers
and have an enhanced ability to compete with Coles and Woolworths that
would not otherwise have been available.
Suppliers to Coles and Woolworths should also be better off. This might
appear to be a paradoxical statement, given the greater buying power that
could be expected to accrue to Woolworths, and given the strategies employed
by  Coles and Woolworths in recent years to squeeze their suppliers (e.g.,
product listing fees, shelf fees, a squeeze on suppliers’ proﬁt margins, and
moves to have fewer branded goods and more home-brand goods in any
given product category). But now suppliers face a different outlook. Many
brand-name manufacturers, especially smaller ones, have been facing the
much less proﬁtable prospect of life without exposure in Woolworths’ and
Coles’ supermarkets, and a ﬁght to shave margins to secure contracts for less
proﬁtable home-brand supply contracts. This pressure may now lessen, if
suppliers have an alternative group through which to sell, although if the two
big chains feel threatened by the expanded IGA group, they may try to force
even more concessions from their suppliers. However, there have been recent
indications that Woolworths and Coles are seeking supply chain improvements
leading to cost savings, but to achieve more they will have to rely on the good-
will and support of manufacturers. Thus, as Whyte (2005) suggests, in order
to improve supply chain logistics such as on-time delivery and shelf-ready
packaging, some bargaining power may have to be conceded to the suppliers.
A supplier may no longer have to yield to heavy pressure from the big two
for fear of losing business. There will now exist an alternative viable chain,
albeit one that might want good deals and that might use some of its new
buying strength to achieve price concessions. However, manufacturers, espe-
cially small- and medium-sized ones, and the IGA group, face a two-edged
sword. Each clearly needs the other to achieve proﬁtable growth, but each
might like to take advantage of its new-found power. In a bilateral bargaining
position like this, each party should realise that a ‘win’ could well prove to be
a Pyrrhic victory, with the ultimate winners being Coles and Woolworths,
and so they should be supportive of each other rather than seeking to exploit 
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their trading partner. Those manufacturers that might previously have been
squeezed by the big two may decide to favour IGA stores with priority treat-
ment in new lines and favoured supply quantities, secure now in the knowledge
that if they offend the big two they do have an alternative outlet to supply.
 
7. Competition enforcement issues
 
Smith (2006) spent some time considering policy problems and enforcement
issues, noting the concern held about high concentration levels and the
decline of the independent supermarket sector, but she emphasises that the
role of the Trade Practices Act is to protect the competitive process, and not
the health of individual competitors.
Mergers between grocery wholesalers have been considered by both the
Federal Court and by the Australian Competition Tribunal in recent years
(see 
 





General of the Commonwealth v Davids Holdings Pty Limited & Anor
 
 (1993)
ATPR 41–226, in which the Federal Court rejected the attempt by Davids to
take over QIW; and 
 
Re Queensland Independent Wholesalers Limited
 
 (1995)
ATPR 41–438, in which the Trade Practices Tribunal, as it then was, approved
a merger between Davids and CBL, another wholesaler, on the grounds that




  of the Trade Practices Commission and its successor, the
ACCC, in the early to mid-1990s indicates the extent of merger activity in
grocery wholesaling at that time.
Smith argues that the creeping acquisitions by the big two chains are difﬁ-
cult for the ACCC to stop under s.50 of the Trade Practices Act, which only
prohibits acquisitions if they are likely to substantially lessen competition in
a market. Given the very small market shares being acquired, it is unlikely
that this could be proved in court – the incremental decline in competition, if
it existed at all, would not be substantial by any calculation. Although it is
perhaps feasible to argue that these acquisitions form a pattern and so
should be treated jointly in order to meet the substantial test, this would be
an innovative argument whose likely success in court cannot be predicted.
What the ACCC has tried to do, when chains have been up for sale due to
an exit strategy (as was the case with the Franklins group) or for some other
reason, has been to broker the allocation of the available stores between the
chains so as to enhance the chances of a relatively pro-competitive outcome,
and this is what it has sought to achieve in the Foodland carve-up. But the
greater the share of the market acquired by the chains, the harder it is for any
new entrant or for a current small chain to expand, so as to become a constrain-
ing force on the incumbents. The regulator does not have an easy job here.
Apart from merger activity, the Woolworths group has been subject to in-
vestigations into its market pricing conduct, which have led to court actions.
A major case (
 







ATPR (Digest) 46–215) involved Safeway, a subsidiary of Woolworths, being 
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charged with price-ﬁxing arrangements and misuse of market power. At ﬁrst
instance Woolworths was cleared of these charges, but on appeal, a majority
of the Full Federal Court largely upheld the ACCC’s allegations (
 
ACCC v
Australian Safeway Stores Pty Limited
 
 (2003) ATPR 41–935). Woolworths
also admitted in 2003 to a price-ﬁxing arrangement in the retailing of liquor














Trading as Mac’s Liquor
 
 2002) ATPR 41–941). Such behaviour indicates less
constraints being applied to its behaviour than is socially optimal, and so the
development of stronger rival retail chains is a welcome event.
The report by the ACCC (2002) into the pricing practices of Coles and
Woolworths, in response to a Senate direction, was unable to conclude that
the chains could induce from suppliers discriminatory prices in their favour
and against independents. Smith does point out, however, that discrimination
may occur in many ways that are hard to detect, and so the ACCC’s ﬁnding
is not deﬁnitive on this issue.
 
8. Summary and conclusions
 
The power of supermarkets – for many years now the power of two in Aus-
tralia – is a topic that produces considerable passion and argument at com-
mercial, social, regulatory and political levels. It is one that has been the
subject of parliamentary committees of inquiry, adds to consultants’ pockets,
keeps regulators, lawyers and judges busy, and provides provocative material
for the media. But our understanding, and empirical assessment, of this market
power is far from complete. The papers by Cotterill (2006) and Smith (2006)
point the way for much-needed research in Australia, and for the development
of data sets that can be used to further our understanding of how supermarkets
operate, and to whose advantage or disadvantage. Cotterill stresses the need
for disaggregate analysis for each functional market. It is hard to disagree
with that, and also with his point that much more research is needed on the
transmission of prices along the supply chain, on the vertical pricing practices
that ﬁrms can use because of their market power, and on the links that permit
vertical strategies to reinforce horizontal anticompetitive behaviour.
The horizontal and vertical relationships involving supermarket chains are
still largely unexplored in any systematic manner by economists in Australia,
although some aspects of their behaviour have been subject to scrutiny by the
Federal Court, at least with respect to price-ﬁxing and misuse of market power.
But a much deeper understanding is needed before we can be conﬁdent that
the two big chains are acting both individually and collectively in the public
interest, in the total welfare meaning of that term recently established by the
Australian Competition Tribunal.
Casual observation suggests that the prospects now are promising for com-
petitive market behaviour by the supermarket chains. After years of increasing
market share for Woolworths and Coles, in part due to creeping acquisitions
and in part due to internal growth and policies of offering consumers low 
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prices, greater convenience and continual improvement in the retailing pack-
age offered to them, we now see the emergence of strong rival third (the IGA
group) and fourth (Aldi) forces in the market, each of which appears to be in
the market for the long haul. The outlook for consumers, currently good,
looks even better. Suppliers may be less threatened than previously with ‘take
it or leave it’ attitudes by Woolworths and Coles, and they may have more
options than was the case only recently.
Market realities in Australia may have turned the tables on economic the-
ory and predictions based on overseas evidence. The regulatory message at
the moment is clear: intervention as a general policy in supermarket retailing
would be socially inefﬁcient. What is needed to guide long-run policy is a
wider range of objective assessments of the supermarket sector, at all of its
functional levels, in terms of static and dynamic efﬁciency issues, sources and
effects of market power, coordinated effects, and also of distributional out-
comes. We need to know exactly who gains and who loses from the activities
of the two big chains, both within and between each functional market in
which they operate. From this we can determine the total impact of their
activities on social welfare.
Only with such research can policy and enforcement issues be fully in-
formed. The costs of unjustiﬁed intervention can easily outweigh the costs of
not intervening when it is called for. Although some functional aspects of the
supermarket supply chain and some regional markets may require attention
on an ongoing basis, any comprehensive investigation is likely to ﬁnd that,
despite the fact that the supermarket sector is one of the most important in
the whole economy, government attention and regulatory intervention could
in most cases be better directed into market failure problems in other markets
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